The impetus for this course first was my participation in an NEH Summer Institute (2010): Representations of the 'Other': Jews in Medieval Christendom. From this seminar, I then applied for a further grant from the Boston College Center for Christian-Jewish Learning to create a model syllabus that would use both Christian and Jewish medieval primary texts, but would also fit well within in a philosophy department. In my grant proposal, I explained the project this way:

"During the summer of 2010, I was fortunate to participate in five week seminar on Jewish-Christian relations in the Middle Ages. This seminar, put on by the National Endowment for the Humanities, brought together twenty educators of English, history, religion, and philosophy. I was lucky to be among the three graduate students admitted. The design of the program was to help the gathered educators to acquire or further an expertise in Jewish-Christian relations in the Middle Ages. The aim was that educators could then use this acquired knowledge to enhance their own undergraduate teaching. Five different scholars in various fields were brought in to introduce us to the different aspects of this complex history. I came away very much enriched by the seminar. I acquired a much deeper knowledge of the social, political, and religious history that constitutes much of the history of Jewish-Christian relations. Likewise, I was fortunate to gain a familiarity with thinkers and texts that I was not aware of beforehand. However, I also left slightly perplexed. As one of the goals of the seminar was to equip us with knowledge that we could then use in undergraduate teaching, it was not immediately clear to me how I should construct a course for my own discipline, philosophy.

"I believe that part of the reason for this quandary is that is not always clear how to engage the intellectual production of these thinkers in a systematic way. It is much easier to proceed historically and create distinctions and divisions across time and region. And this is what our seminar primarily did. However things become more complex when one becomes interested in the exchange and compatibility of ideas. Here the divide between community, time, and even religion does not always provide us with a very helpful picture of the exchange of ideas between Jews and Christians. In fact, certain historical and religious divisions mask genuine conceptual commonalities among Jewish and Christian thinkers as well as deep differences between co-religionists.

"In light of this, I would like to undertake a very conscientious and detailed design of a philosophy of religion course that would use the texts of Medieval Jewish and Christian thinkers as its source texts, dividing them according to the customary problems of philosophy of religion. Such a course would not only provide a possible path in which the dynamic of Jewish-Christian relations could enter into a mainstream philosophy department, but it would also provide a different perspective from which Jew and Christian thinkers in the Middle Ages can be compared and contrasted ."

In response to this proposal I received the young scholars grant from the Center for Christian-Jewish Learning to prepare the following syllabus and to make it available online. I have prepared the syllabus under the direction of Daniel J. Lasker, the 2010-2011 Concoran Visiting Chair at Boston College and a world expert on Jewish and Christian medieval polemical literature.

The objectives of the course are two-fold. First, it is hoped that students will be introduced to the classical problems of philosophy of religion as they appear in their medieval forms. These problems are enduring and have plagued philosophy from its inception to the modern day. Further, by focusing on these problems, within a particular historical period, students will be confronted with unusual and foreign perspectives on these problems that one would not often find in purely contemporary discussions. Likewise, because of the undeniable reliance of medieval thought on the classical past, students will be forced to engage with both the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions in deeper ways.

The second objective of this course is to become more familiar with common concerns that characterize both Jewish and Christian philosophical approaches to religion. Through comparing and contrasting these positions, we will be attentive to the range of possible solutions to these common problems. We will also look at the impetus for these solutions and try to assess how and whether the religious background of each thinker informs their attempted solution. In short, we will look to see how the "particularist" claims of "particularist" religions affect and shape philosophy's supposedly "universalist" and common approach to religious concerns.

Course Packet

See also Primary Source Bibliography

Attendance and strong participation will be a must for this course.

Semi-weekly responses that require students to struggle with major interpretative questions. It is expected that students delve into some of the secondary source material in forming their response.

A substantial research paper where students choose one of the core problems and focus on a problematic aspect of Jewish/Christian responses. It is expected that chosen problems will engage with both Jewish and Christian sources. This may come about either through recognizing a common problem that both traditions share or by noting a problem that is unique to a particular tradition, and helping the reader to understand why this problem is unique to only one of these two closely related religious traditions.

Problem Description

Negotiating and articulating the relationship between faith and reason is a necessary prologue to any philosophy religion. It is here that boundaries are drawn and the formal identity of a philosophy of religion is established in contrast to other approaches to religious truth. For the medievals, the most dominant contrast with faith or theology, which typically takes revealed data as its central starting point. However, understanding and distinguishing between faith and reason was also important for the medievals for another reason: namely, it was a serious and debated question as to whether and to what extent faith could improve a genuinely philosophical discourse.

In this opening problem, we begin from Maimonides' reflections on the history and influence of "Kalam" in both Christian and Muslim forms. We will pay special attention to what Maimonides understands by "Kalam" and his criticisms of it. Some attention will be given to the ways modern scholarship has criticized the historical narrative Maimonides provides. From here we momentarily move backward in time to consider the work of Saadia and to evaluate his approach to faith and reason in light of the narrative given by Maimonides. Finally, we turn explicitly to the perspective on faith and reason in the works of Thomas Aquinas. The views of Thomas Aquinas will be put alongside those of Maimonides so that we can draw a fruitful comparison. We will also try to assess the place that Aquinas holds with respect to the Christian tradition itself, both with what comes before and with what immediately follows.

Readings

• Primary Sources

  • Saadia, Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Introduction
  • Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, I, 71-73
  • Anselm, Proslogion, Chapter 1
  • Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, c. 4-7
  • Ockham, "The Possibility of Natural Theology" in Boehner, Ockham - Philosophical Writings: A Selection, 96-113

• Secondary Sources

  • Buijs, J. A. "Religion and Philosophy in Maimonides, Averroes, and Aquinas," 160–183
  • Dobbs-Weinstein, I., Maimonides and St. Thomas on the Limits of Reason, 1995
  • Lasker, Daniel, Jewish Philosophical Polemics against Christianity in the Middle Ages, "Introduction"
  • Stroumsa, Sarah, Maimonides in his World: Portrait of a Mediterranean Thinker, chapter 1, "Theological Context," section, "Islamic theology," 24-38

Problem Description

In light of the importance of revealed data for medieval thinkers and their interest in its potential value for good philosophy, it makes sense to consider early on whether or not there can be a philosophical justification for this revealed data. Medieval Christians and Jews were certainly aware of the need to find some way to justify and validate what they took to be real and authoritative revelation. In short, reason plays a role in what we choose to be our 'authorities'. Thus how revelation occurs and how it can be identified as genuine were central preoccupations for Jews and Christians alike. In this section we compare the philosophical justifications of revelation and prophecy found in the Jewish sources of Saadia, Maimonides, and Gersonides with the justifications found in Aquinas and Duns Scotus.

Readings

• Primary Sources

  • Saadia, Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Treatise III, 3-10
  • Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, Book II, 32, 35-40, 42
  • Gersonides, The Wars of Lord, Book II, “Dreams, Divination, and Prophecy” (excerpts)
  • Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IIa-IIae, qq. 171-174
  • Scotus, Ordinatio, Part 2, "On the Truth of Sacred Scripture", in Vatican I:61-85, nn. 101-119 (excerpts)

• Secondary Sources

  • Altmann, A., “Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas: Natural or Divine Prophecy?,” 1–19.
  • Kreisel, Howard, Prophecy: History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy
  • Reines, Alvin J., Maimonides and Abrabanel on Prophecy
  • Rynhold, Daniel, An Introduction to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, c. 4, "Prophecy," 104-130

Problem Description

The question of God's existence is the first and most foundational question of medieval philosophical approaches to God. The quest to provide a rational account for the beliefs of a religious system begins with the search for a rational demonstration of the existence of God.

In this section, we consider first Maimonides' proofs for God's existence. Here, we will be introduced to the idea of the cosmological argument in particular and the form this argument takes in both Aristotle's and Maimonides' work. Of particular interest will be what these proofs seem to tell us about who God is. The attributes of unity, incorporeality, and necessary existence will be especially important as they will carry with them ramifications for how philosophy may approach the religious doctrine of creation (Problem IV) and the possibility of divine attributes (Problem V). After looking a Maimonides' proofs, we compare these proofs with the five-ways of Thomas Aquinas. To these arguments, we add a consideration of Anselm's ontological argument and its fate in the medieval Christian tradition.

Central to our general consideration is the tension between the religious desire for a rational proof and religious dissatisfaction with the kind of God that a philosophical proof seems to demand. A brief consideration of Judah Halevi's critique of Aristotelian-like proofs will serve as helpful example of this tension.

Readings

• Primary Sources

  • Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk 12 (proof for a prime mover)
  • Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, Book II, selected propositions, Book II, 1
  • Judah Halevi, Kuzari, (excerpt)
  • Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 3, (the five ways)
  • Anselm, Proslogion (selections)
  • Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 9 (against the ontological argument)
  • Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 2, q. 1, "The Existence of God" in Wolter, Duns Scotus - Philosophical Writings: A Selection, 35-81

• Secondary Sources

  • Rynhold, Daniel, An Introduction to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, c. 1, 27-48
  • Wolfson, Harry, "Maimonides and Halevi: A Study in Typical Jewish Attitudes Towards Greek Philosophy in the Middle Ages," 297-337

Problem Description

In light of the centrality of the cosmological argument for philosophical attempts to prove God's existence, we next turn to what these argument can tell us about who God is and the manner in which he can and cannot relate to the physical world. In particular, we focus on the difficulty of how an immaterial being can have a causal role in physical change. We look first at Aristotle's view of how God can (and cannot be) thought of as the first cause. Secondly, we turn to the neo-Platonic qualifications of Aristotle's idea. In surveying Aristotle's solution to this problem, we will also be attentive to the close connection between this solution and Aristotle's position on the eternity of the world.

With these fundamental conceptual problems and possible solutions in the background, we move to see how Jewish and Christian sources adopted, altered, or rejected these philosophical approaches. Much time will be spent considering a third view of creation - creatio ex nihilo - against the Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic positions. Our attention will be on how Jewish and Christian authors dealt with the philosophical objections to creatio ex nihilo as well as how far they thought reason could go toward either demonstrating the fact of creatio ex nihilo or demonstrating its impossibility. The latter question was particularly acute for medieval thinkers, since Aristotle's beloved cosmological proof for God's existence, at times, appeared to required that the world was eternal. Maimonides and Aquinas together represent a middle ground in this debate, arguing that: while reason cannot demonstrate creatio ex nihilo, neither can reason demonstrate the necessity of the eternity of the world. In this way, they attempt to put some distance between Aristotle and themselves. Further, in recognizing the impotence of reason at this juncture, they established a place where faith must become operative. As representatives of the two extremes, we will look at the positions of Gersonides and John Pecham respectively. Gersonides disagrees with Maimonides and believes that reason can establish that creatio ex nihilo is not possible, and we will further consider how he believes this to be perfectly compatible with Jewish teaching. On the other hand, we will see in John Pecham's debate with Aquinas, a view the claims to have found a genuine demonstration against the eternity of the world and in support of the doctrine creatio ex nihilo.

Readings

• Primary Sources

  • Aristotle, Physics, (Selections) (Arguments for the eternity of the world)
  • Plotinus, Enneads (Selections on Emanation)
  • Saadia, Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Treatise 1
  • Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, II, 13-19, 22, 25, 27
  • Gersonides, The Wars of the Lord, Book VI, part one, “Creation of the World,” (selections)
  • Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 46, a. 2, “Is it an article of faith that the world began”
  • Aquinas, On the Eternity of the World, in Medieval Sourcebook (online, Trans. Robert T. Miller)
  • Pecham, On the Eternity of the World, in Potter (trans.), 1993

• Secondary Sources

  • Brady, I., "John Pecham and the Background of Aquinas's De aeternitate mundi," 141-154
  • Feldman, Seymour "Gersonides' Proofs for the Creation of the Universe," 113-137
  • Jarnevic, D. P. "St. Thomas Aquinas and the Controversy regarding the Eternity of the World. A Response to Professor Gerald J. Massey," 153
  • Potter, Vincent "Introduction", vii-xix
  • Rynhold, Daniel, An Introduction to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, c. 2, 49-77
  • Seeskin, Kenneth, Maimonides on the Origin of the World

Problem Description

In this problem, we consider how philosophers have approached the question of human speech about God. As we explore the problem we follow a two-fold difficulty. On the one hand, we analyze the way Jewish and Christian philosophers assess the general applicability of human attributes to God. Much attention will be given here to the philosophical commitment to God's unity and by extension God's incorporeality. Are human words and descriptions, formed in corporeal and multifarious reality, actually applicable to God? Can they signify anything true? If so, how? On the other hand, setting aside the problem of human language, we consider the more fundamental question of whether a description of the divine is in principle possible. This is a deeper ontological or metaphysical question about God's nature. The answer to this question rests on the nature of one's prior philosophical commitment to the simplicity of God. The thinkers treated here will wrestle with the question of whether God can have any attributes at all or whether attributes necessarily add complexity into the essential nature of the divine.

The problem for Jewish and Christians thinkers alike can be traced all the way back to Moses' encounter with God on Mount Sinai and his request that God reveal to him His name. In our discussion, we begin by considering how Saadia and Maimonides, armed with their established philosophical convictions, navigate both of the above problems. Because of the highly anthropomorphized language of Jewish canonical texts, the first problem about the value of human language will be particularly acute. We will watch to see how each philosopher explains how this anthropomorphized language should be interpreted. In the Guide, I, 51-52 Maimonides catalogue five categories of attributes and assess whether or not any of these attributes can be applied to God in principle. From here we will turn to Gersonides' critique of Maimonides.

Turning from Jewish sources to Christian, we observe how Christian thinkers wrestle with the same twofold problem. We will look first to Aquinas's notion of God's simplicity and his analogical approach to speech about God; for Aquinas, this approach provides a middle way between pure equivocity and a kind of speech about God that claims adequacy. Special attention will be given to comparing this approach to that of Maimonides, noting both similarities and differences. Finally, we will consider both Scotus's argument for the possibility of univocal speech about God and his own view about divine simplicity. We will also compare Scotus's disagreement with Aquinas on the one hand and Gersonides's disagreement with Maimonides on the other. Here we will look for common convictions behind these two critiques.

Readings

• Primary Sources

  • Saadia, Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Treatise 2 (on the Unity of God, and other Attributes)
  • Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed I, 1-49 (selections) (on exegesis in light of philosophical principles)
  • Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed I, 50-52, 54, 57-59 (on the possibility of divine attributes in principle)
  • Gersonides, The Wars of the Lord, Book III, “Divine Knowledge”, esp. c. 3, (a critique of the Maimonidean position)
  • Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 13, "The Names of God"
  • Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 3, "On the Simplicity of God"
  • Scotus, Primacy of 'Being' among the Other Trancendentals, in Wolter, Duns Scotus - Philosophical Writings: A Selection, 4-8

• Secondary Sources

  • Benor, Ehud, "Meaning and Reference in Maimonides' Negative Theology", 339-360
  • Broadie, A, "Maimonides and Aquinas on the Names of God," 157-170
  • Buijs, J. A. "A Maimonidean Critique of Thomistic Analogy," 449-470
  • Cross, Richard, "God: Perfection, Infinity, and Religious Language” in Duns Scotus, 31-46
  • Hyman, Arther, “Maimonides on Religious Language," 175-191
  • Rawidowicz, S., "Saadya’s Purification of the Idea of God", 139-166
  • Rynhold, Daniel, An Introduction to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, c. 3, 78-105

Problem Description

In light of the evident centrality that the philosophical doctrine of divine simplicity plays for both Jewish and Christian authors, it is worth our time to explore the polemical role that this doctrine plays in Christian and Jewish debates. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity lies at the center of this debate and for Jewish thinkers (and often many Christian thinkers) this doctrine challenges the rationality and philosophical validity of Christian conceptions of God. In this debate, we will see previously examined philosophical principles put to work, as they are used to establish the boundaries of rationality, and consequently the boudaries of true religion.

Readings

• Primary Sources

  • Hasdai Crescas, Refutation of the Christian Principles, Trinity
  • Nachmanides, Barcelona Disputation

• Secondary Sources

  • Lasker, Daniel, Jewish Philosophical Polemics against Christianity in the Middle Ages, c. 4, 45-104
  • Movie: The Disputation - Nachmanides Debates Before King James of Aragon

Problem Description

In this problem we begin with the puzzle of Aristotle's Book X of the Ethics and the difficulty it has posed for commentators since it was written. Our attention will then turn to how Jewish and Christian thinkers have (or have not) adopted Aristotle's convictions regarding the happy life. Of particular interest is how these thinkers synthesize Aristotle's vision(s) of happiness with the traditional religious visions of the happy life as conveyed in their respective sacred texts.

After introducing ourselves to Aristotle, we turn first to Saadia and his general praise of the practical life. Here, we will be introduced to the Jewish notion of "mitzvot" (or the laws of the Torah) and how it functions, either as a mere preparation for the happy life or conversely as constitutive of the happy life itself. Next, we turn to Maimonides' intellectualist vision of the happy life and the value he assigns to both the practical life and religious practice and ritual. In transitioning from Maimonides to Aquinas, we will first turn back to Augustine's extremely influential remarks on the happy life and the (im)possibility of achieving the happy life in this life. We then meet Aquinas at a crossroads: where the Aristotelian and Augustinian traditions seem opposed. Our focus will be on how he attempts to synthesize these two separate traditions and bring them into harmony. Specifically, he introduces two kinds of happiness, natural and supernatural happiness. In light of this distinction between kinds of happiness, we will look carefully at the role and the importance of religious practice in comparison to the position of Maimonides.

Readings

• Primary Sources

  • Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book X (An introduction to the two lives)
  • Saadia, Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Treatise X
  • Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, III, 27 and III, 54
  • Augustine, City of God, Book XIX, c. 19 (On the impossibility of happiness in this life)
  • Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae, qq. 1-5 (Treatise on Happiness)

• Secondary Sources

  • Bradley, D. J.M., Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good
  • Goodman, Lenn E., "Saadiah's Ethical Pluralism," 407-419
  • Menachem Kellner, Maimonides on Human Perfection
  • Rynhold, Daniel, An Introduction to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, c. 7, 180-204

Problem Description

In this section we focus on the nature of law and the (im)possibility of its rational justification. We start by looking at some of the concerns with a project aimed at rationally justifying divinely revealed laws: concerns voiced both in the early rabbinic period and debates within Kalam between the Mut'azilites and the Ash'arites. From here we move to the development of distinct categories of laws, with which reason relates in different ways. We will look at Saadia first, who appears to shows a willingness to recognize some laws which reason can explain and other laws that reason cannot explain. Nevertheless, we will see that even these latter laws can be seen to a have a rational basis. From here we turn to Maimonides, who some see as being critical of the kind of approached advanced by Saadia in a favor of an even more rationalist approach to laws. Still, we will see Maimonides struggle to find explanations for certain classes of laws. Eventually he will introduce the notions of the first and second intentions of laws to help him deal with those religious laws whose justification does not appear obvious to common reason. Finally, we look at Aquinas, who makes a distinction between four kinds of law. Our attention will focus especially on the difference between Natural and Divine laws. However, we will also consider Aquinas' reflection on the Old and New Laws and whether there can be a rational justification for the creation of new obligations and the abandonment of old obligations. In discussing this problem, students will be introduced to common categories of ethical reasoning, such as "consequentialist reasoning", "teleological or virtue ethics," and "deontological commands."

Readings

• Primary Sources

  • Saadia, Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Treatise III
  • Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, III, 25-34
  • Aquinas, Treatise on Law, Ia-IIae, qq. 90-108 (Treatise on Law)

• Secondary Sources

  • Fox, Marvin, "On the Rational commandments in Saadia's Philosophy," 33-43
  • Goodman, Lenn, "Rational Law/Revealed Law," 109-139
  • Rynhold, Daniel, An Introduction to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, c. 5, "Rationalising the Commandments," 104-130
  • Rynhold, Daniel, "Justifying One's Practices," in Two models of Jewish Philosophy, chapter 1

Problem Description

In this section, we first introduce ourselves to the problem of evil in general, its classical formulation, and the division of the problem into its "evidental" and "logical" forms. Subsequently, we turn to an early medieval text, foundational for all considerations of the problem of evil: the Consolation of Philosophy. From Boethius' description of Lady Philosophy's answer to the problem of evil and it's correlative conception of divine providence, we will see an example of a fairly traditional philosophical solution to the problem of evil and the kind of God that this solution presumes. Here we will be introduced to the notion of evil as an actual "nothingness" or mere privation of the good. With this initial solution in the background, we can look to alternative solutions proposed by Boethius himself and later Saadia. In each of these subsequent solutions, we will note certain dissatisfactions with the easy dismissal of evil in a "privation theory" and with the conception of God as an aloof and uninvolved observer. In response, new solutions will be proposed that imagine a more interactive God, who is involved with the minutia of creaturely affairs. In turn, we can see justifications for suffering, which are rooted in appeals to the actions of individuals and to the contingent circumstances of each particular moment. In our survey of both Boethius and Saadia, we will also be attentive to the more strictly religious presuppositions that underly their solutions: most notably, the ideas of immorality and the after-life.

Following our consideration of the traditional philosophical response and early reactions, we turn to the views of Maimonides, Gersonides, and Aquinas. These views will be compared with the earlier views as well as with each other. In particular, we will note how Maimonides and Gersonides return to a more naturalistic notion of providence, and we will evaluate how this impacts their solutions to the problem of evil. With the thought of these two Jewish thinkers in the background, we will evaluate Aquinas' views on providence and the extent to which suffering is a feature of the created order or the result of particular decision of the divine will.

Readings

• Primary Sources

  • Saadia, Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Treatise 5
  • Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, III, 12
  • Gersonides, The Wars of the Lord, Book 4, “Divine Providence”
  • Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, Book III (Lady Philosophy's answer to the problem of evil and notion of providence)
  • Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV and V (Boethius' new idea of providence and corresponding answer to the problem of evil)
  • Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, cc. 1-16 (on the nature of evil)
  • Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, cc. 64, 71-77 (on providence and its relation to contingent singulars)

• Secondary Sources

  • Bleich, J. David, Providence in the Philosophy of Gersonides
  • Rynhold, Daniel, An Introduction to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, c. 8, 205-222
  • Stump, Eleonore, "Aquinas on the Sufferings of Job," 49-68

Problem Description

For our final problem, we focus on what philosophy has to say about the possibility of an afterlife and a bodily resurrection. This question takes on considerable interest for us in light of the important role the notion of an after-life played both for philosophy's attempt to make sense of religious notions of happiness as well as for philosophy's attempt to form a coherent explanation for the undeniable reality of suffering,

We focus first on the arguments for the immortality of the soul. We will compare the responses given in the work of Saadia, Maimonides, and Aquinas, while paying homage, where appropriate, to the Aristotelian foundation underlying their reasoning.

After considering the possibility of the immortality of the soul, we move to considerations of the possibility of a bodily resurrection in the same authors. Here we will be attentive to why this is such an important concern for these religious philosophers as well as to the specifics of their arguments. This final consideration will involve us in a larger question about miracles. This larger question forms an effective conclusion for our course. It brings together many of the themes that have already arisen in earlier problems; most notably, we will be forced to reconsider God's relationship to the created order and his ability to alter or violate the laws of nature. Moreover we will have occasion to face once more the question of what reason can understand and the possibility of what reason cannot demonstrate.

Readings

• Primary Sources

  • Saadia, Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Treatise 6, Concerning the essence of the souls and after death (dealing with the immortality of the soul)
  • Saadia, Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Treatise 7, “Concerning the Resurrection of the Dead in This World”
  • Maimondies, Epistle on Resurrection
  • Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles II, 82, Argument for the Immortality of the (intellectual/rational) Soul
  • Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, 80-81, Arguments for and Against the Resurrection of the Body

• Secondary Sources

  • Hartman, David "Discussion of The Essay on Resurrection," in Epistles of Maimonides, 246-281